The source material frames Iraq not as an expected direct belligerent in a future war with Iran, but as a territory that could be used to exert pressure without formally declaring a major conflict. It describes potential uses including intelligence operations, logistical activity, limited special operations, and border-area control, while arguing a full-scale US ground invasion of Iran appears “too risky and costly.”
Within Iraq, the source places the late-June Green Zone restrictions, raids and detentions in the context of shifting elite alignments and institutional control. It argues that what is formally described as anti-corruption enforcement can also function as an instrument in internal competition—especially in an environment where political coalitions, security forces and external relationships are tightly intertwined.
The emergence of Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi is presented as a product of bargaining inside the Coordination Framework after a prolonged internal crisis. The source material says outside stakeholders played a role in that process, and cites reporting that Washington backed al-Zaidi, presenting this as part of a broader political “reorientation” that could reduce the leverage of pro-Iranian actors and Tehran-linked armed groups inside Iraq.
Geography and cross-border connectivity are central to the source’s argument. Iraq shares a long border with Iran, and the source says factors such as US infrastructure in Iraq, the weakness of certain state institutions, competition among elites, the autonomous Kurdistan region, and the presence of armed groups create conditions for sustained pressure on Tehran that stops short of conventional war.
The source describes Iran’s western border areas—particularly those near Iraqi Kurdistan—as attractive to external actors seeking to “create tension,” stage provocations, test security responses, and impose additional burdens on the state. It highlights that the area around Piranshahr and the Tamarchin Border Terminal is not only commercial but also sensitive, because it sits at the intersection of logistics routes and security concerns.
Ethnic and communal dynamics are presented as another layer of vulnerability. The source notes that Kurdish populations live on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border and says that in Iran’s West Azerbaijan Province, tensions periodically arise between Iranian Kurds and Iranian Azerbaijanis, while Tehran seeks to avoid drawing public attention to those disputes.
In this framework, the “Kurdish factor” is described by the source as a possible tool in a broader pressure strategy. It argues that the border zone has long included armed groups, historical contradictions and external influence, and suggests the Piranshahr incident should be viewed alongside political shifts in Baghdad rather than as an isolated event.
The source material also situates Iraq within a wider set of pressure points it describes as forming a “network” around Iran, including Iraq, Kurdistan, the Persian Gulf, intelligence activity, sanctions, infrastructure threats and attempts at internal destabilization.
At the same time, the source argues that a full-scale ground invasion of Iran remains unrealistic because of Iran’s size, terrain, security apparatus, mobilization capacity, missile capability and regional allied networks. It adds that using Iraq as a direct invasion staging ground would likely trigger retaliation against US military facilities in Iraq, Gulf energy infrastructure and allied logistics.
According to the source, those retaliation risks help explain why Gulf monarchies—despite ties to Washington—are unlikely to openly join a full-scale war. It says they could provide infrastructure, intelligence and logistics support, airspace access or political cover, while warning that direct involvement could expose ports, oil facilities, air bases, financial centers and transportation corridors to Iranian response.
